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 1 
“The Government of Desire: A Genealogical Perspective” 
Miguel de Beistegui, The University of Warwick 
 
I. “The Man of Desire” 
Desire is everywhere – everywhere recognised, displayed, discussed, and 
drawn upon.  It is so much part of our lives, so deeply entrenched in our bodies and 
minds – so “hard-wired” into our brains, some would say – that we cannot imagine a 
life without it, indeed cannot imagine what it could mean to live without experiencing 
its force and appeal, but also the conflicts and struggles it gives rise to.  The Law of 
Desire, Almodóvar would say, is one by which we live.  It seems to play a crucial part 
in understanding who we are, our sense of self, and our relations to others.  Its 
ubiquity, we claim, is a sign of its rootedness in human nature.  We readily admit that 
it is a force we need to reckon with, and governs us, often beyond our own will, but 
we do not question that we are creatures – and not just subjects – of desire.  
What, in that context, are we to make, of the somewhat elliptical and puzzling 
remark that Michel Foucault made in the course of a discussion at The University of 
Berkeley in 1983, according to which the western civilisation is the civilisation of 
desire?1  We might find this suggestion needlessly provocative.  To the extent, as we 
tend to believe, that desire is a constitutive feature of human nature, aren’t all 
civilisations by definition civilisations of desire?  Isn’t desire so bound up with who 
we are that the very suggestion that civilisation itself – any civilisation – not be its 
expression, that is, not recognise it, integrate it, organise it, in short, deal with it in 
some way, can only come across as fanciful?  Yet I want to take my point of 
                                                     
1 M. Foucault, Qu’est-ce que la critique? followed by La culture de soi, edited by Henri-Paul 
Fruchaud and Daniele Lorenzini, with an Introduction and notes by Daniele Lorenzini and 
Arnold Davidson (Paris: Vrin, 2015), 145.  See also M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité I. 
La volonté de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 102.  
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departure in that provocation and consider seriously the possibility that our culture of 
desire has an origin and a history, and a very western history at that.  Following 
Foucault, and extending his thought where necessary, I want to take seriously his 
suggestion that desire, or, better said perhaps, the problem of desire, emerged at a 
particular time and under specific historical circumstances; that it had a particular and 
far-reaching history; that it defines who we are today in ways that we aren’t always 
aware of, and aren’t inevitable.  In what follows, I will attempt to define the limits or 
contours of the various configurations or “regimes” of desire under which we live, 
trace their emergence, and measure their consequences.  However, despite my wish – 
one could say my fantasy – to imagine a philosophical history of desire from Greek 
and Roman Antiquity to the present day, I will limit myself to exploring the roots and 
sketching the dominant features of the contemporary face of desire.    
The general question that, in my view, triggers Foucault’s interest in desire is 
the question that he claims to have been concerned with throughout his life, namely: 
who are we?  More precisely: who are we today?  The role of philosophy, he claims 
in an interview from 1967, “is to diagnose.  The philosopher has ceased to try and say 
what is eternally.  The far more arduous and fleeting task he is now faced with is to 
say what is happening.” 2  Here, we have an image of philosophy that, in the interview 
from which the passage is extracted Foucault traces back to Nietzsche.  Elsewhere, 
however, and perhaps surprisingly, he traces it back to Kant – not the Kant of the 
critical project, who seeks to identify the conditions and limits of human experience 
and knowledge, but the Kant of the historical essays, and of “An Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment?” in particular.  In that essay, Kant raises the 
question of philosophy against the backdrop of an event, the Enlightenment, which he 
                                                     
2 M. Foucault, Dits et écrits (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), volume 1, 581. 
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defines as “the courage to make use of one’s own understanding” and the “public use 
of one’s reason.”  Philosophy, then, insofar as it is bound up with such a project, is 
identified with an “attitude” and an “ethos,” best described as the “permanent critique 
of our historical era”3 and the “historical ontology of ourselves.”4  To philosophise is 
to ask about the manner in which we are governed, the authority under which we live, 
and the truths we live by, all of which contribute to making us the subjects that we are.  
But it is also, and at the same time, to ask ourselves whether and how we could 
govern ourselves differently, the sort of subjects we could become, the kind of self we 
could be.   
It seems, then, and following Foucault’s own clue, that by interrogating desire, 
and the manner in which we came to recognise ourselves as subjects of desire, we can 
arrive at a critical ontology of our present and ourselves, and, potentially at least, 
become a different kind of subject.  But the manner in which Foucault poses the 
question, and interrogates desire, is radically different from the hermeneutics of desire 
and subjectivity that, from Augustine and Christian pastoral care to the 
psychoanalytic cure, we have grown accustomed to, and which takes the form of the 
following imperative: “Tell me your desire, and I’ll tell you who you are” – radically 
different, that is, from the tradition that’s concerned with the desires themselves, their 
content and their object, with understanding them, interpreting them, and analysing 
them, with a view to revealing their hidden meaning, intrinsic value, and truth. Rather, 
the question is one of knowing how, under what conditions and circumstances, the 
western subject came to recognise him- or herself as a subject of desire, how his or 
her subjectivity was shaped around the problematic of desire, and how desire itself 
                                                     
3 Dits et écrits II. 1976-1988 (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001), 1390. 
4 M. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” translated by Catherine Porter, in Paul Rabinow 
(ed.), The Foucault Reader: an Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1984), 45. 
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became an object of “veridiction.”  In other words, the question concerns the 
emergence of what Foucault calls “the man of desire.” 
Let me now turn to the genealogy itself.  It seems to me that, in the period that 
stretches between 1975 and 1980, Foucault was precisely involved in laying the 
foundations of such a broader genealogy.  Whilst the history of sexuality, carried out 
in Abnormal (1975) and the first volume of History of Sexuality (1976), provides key 
insights into the inscription of desire within psychiatric discourse and bourgeois 
power via the concept of sexual instinct, the genealogy of political economy, carried 
out in Security, Territory, Population (1978) and The Birth of Biopolitics (1979), 
reveals a different kind of connection or convergence, namely, between desire and 
economic self-interest.  Those two configurations and rationalities of desire overlap 
and intersect in ways that are at times complex, and create tensions: the contemporary 
subject of desire is far from being a unified and harmonious totality, and may very 
well include other regimes than the two I shall be investigating in this paper. 
 
II. Desire and Self-Interest: the Birth of Homo Economicus 
 The two connections, or senses of desire, can be seen as two consequences of 
the emergence of a new kind of power in the eighteenth century, namely, biopower, 
which doesn’t so much replace sovereign power as it overlaps with it, and 
complicates it.  Where sovereign power was seen as the right to “take life and let live,” 
according to Foucault’s famous formulation, biopower can be seen as the power that 
rules over life itself, invests it, governs it, manages it.  It is the right to “make live and 
let die.”  It is the power that targets subjects as population and as living human beings, 
that is, as beings whose identity is defined by the fact that they are alive, and thus 
imbued with a certain naturalness.  The emergence of what Foucault calls liberal 
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governmentality is itself to be situated within that power shift.  We need to be a bit 
clearer here: Foucault’s claim is not that the notion of population didn’t exist prior to 
the birth of biopower.  It’s a notion that can be found as early as Bacon’s Essays 
(1597).5  But Foucault’s point is that the problem of population in the classical age 
was entirely bound up with a specific problem, that of the power of the sovereign, and 
with the question of territory, as that over which the sovereign’s power is extended.  
It’s a problem, yes, but only insofar as it interests the sovereign, and it interests the 
sovereign primarily as a quantity that can be used: a large population is a source of 
power in that it provides troops and resources.  Population is contrasted with 
depopulation, which can happen as a result of wars, diseases, or famine.  So the 
problem of population, even for the mercantilists and cameralists of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, remains subordinated to the rationality of the state and the 
question of how to increase its power.  
 This begins to change in the eighteenth century, and with the physiocrats in 
particular: the population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right, of the 
sovereign’s will, but as a set of natural processes, which need to be managed.  What 
does this mean? 
 It means, first of all, that it’s recognised as a complex phenomenon, which 
depends on a large series of variables, such as the climate, material surroundings, 
commerce, customs and laws, moral and religious values, means of subsistence, etc.  
Because of that complexity, it’s not immediately transparent to the sovereign’s action, 
and the relation between the population and the sovereign can’t be one of obedience 
or refusal of obedience, submission or revolt.  One can’t act on those variables 
                                                     
5 The Essays of Francis Bacon, edited, with introduction and notes, by Mary Augusta Scott 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908), Chapter XXIX, “Of the True Greatness of 
Kingdoms and Estates.” 
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through sheer voluntarism.  It’s no longer possible to think of the relation as one of 
the type: “Do this.”  It requires a different rationality of government, namely 
management, and a different kind of knowledge, namely, political economy.  
 At the same time, the question is also one of knowing whether, beneath all 
those variables, which now need to be recognised, analysed, combined, there is 
something like an invariant, or a “mainspring of action” that the population as a whole 
would share, and which should therefore become the object or target of government.  
And that’s precisely desire.  Not in the old sense of concupiscence, and in connection 
with the Christian problematic of the flesh, but in the sense of the irreducible, 
indivisible, natural core of human life, now identified with the concept of interest. Far 
from being anodyne, the shift of the notion and rationality of interest, from the 
sovereign, with whom, up until the seventeenth century, it was identified, to the 
individual, was itself a remarkable event, and one that corresponded to the need, on 
the part of state reason itself, to limit its own power. 
Foucault recognises this key development in a single yet fairly long passage, 
which I will cite and comment on in various stages. In the lecture from 25 January 
1978, he tries to define what he means by the emergence of the concept of population, 
the new type of power it requires (biopower), and the new science that defines it 
(political economy).  It’s in that context that he writes the following: 
 
 We could also say that the naturalness of the population appears in a 
second way in the fact that this population is of course made up of individuals 
who are quite different from each other and whose behavior, within a certain 
limit at least, cannot be accurately predicted. Nevertheless, according to the first 
theorists of population in the eighteenth century, there is at least one invariant 
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that means that the population taken as a whole has one and only one 
mainspring of action. This is desire.   
 
Desire, he goes on to say, is obviously an old notion, which first appeared and was 
employed in spiritual direction.  But it makes its second appearance within techniques 
of power and government. Every individual, it is now thought, acts out of desire; and 
one can do nothing against the force of desire: 
 
As Quesnay says: You cannot stop people from living where they think they 
will profit most and where they desire to live, because they desire that profit. Do 
not try to change them; things will not change.  However – and it is here that 
this naturalness of desire thus marks the population and becomes accessible to 
governmental technique – for reasons to which we will have to come back and 
which are one of the important theoretical elements of the whole system, this 
desire is such that, if one gives it free play, and on condition that it is given free 
play, all things considered, within a certain limit and thanks to a number of 
relationships and connections, it will produce the general interest of the 
population. Desire is the pursuit of the individual’s interest. In his desire the 
individual may well be deceived regarding his personal interest, but there is 
something that does not deceive, which is that the spontaneous, or at any rate 
both spontaneous and regulated play of desire will in fact allow the production 
of an interest, of something favorable for the population. The production of the 
collective interest through the play of desire is what distinguishes both the 
naturalness of population and the possible artificiality of the means one adopts 
to manage it. 
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The significance of this shift cannot be underestimated: 
 
 This is important because you can see that with this idea of a management 
of populations on the basis of the naturalness of their desire, and of the 
spontaneous production of the collective interest by desire, we have something 
that is completely the opposite of the old ethical-juridical conception of 
government and the exercise of sovereignty. For what was the sovereign for the 
jurists, for medieval jurists but also for the theorists of natural law, for Hobbes 
as well as for Rousseau? The sovereign is the person who can say no to any 
individual’s desire, the problem being how to legitimize this “no” opposed to 
individuals’ desire and found it on the will of these same individuals. 
 
In the old ethical-juridical conception of government, but also in the Christian 
conception of the good life, desire is what is opposed and dominated.  This is what 
changes with the advent of governmentality and the birth of political economy:  
 
Now through the economic-political thought of the physiocrats we see a 
completely different idea taking shape, which is that the problem of those who 
govern must absolutely not be how they can say no, up to what point they can 
say no, and with what legitimacy they can say no.  The problem is how they can 
say yes; it is how to say yes to this desire.  The problem is not therefore the limit 
of concupiscence or the limit of self-esteem in the sense of love of oneself, but 
concerns rather everything that stimulates and encourages this self- esteem, this 
desire, so that it can produce its necessary beneficial effects. We have here 
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therefore the matrix of an entire, let’s say, utilitarian philosophy.6 
 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, self-interest was seen as a natural law 
governing human action, which any good (or reasonable) government would seek to 
take into account.  “Just as the physical world is ruled by the laws of motion,” 
Helvétius writes, “no less is the moral universe ruled by the laws of interest.”7  
Similarly, James Steuart’s An Inquiry into The Principles of Political Economy (1767), 
which introduced the term “political economy” in the English language, defines self-
interest as “the universal spring of human actions,” and draws the following 
conclusions for their government:  
 
The principle of self-interest... is the main spring, and only motive which a 
statesman should make use of, to engage a free people to concur in the plans 
which he lays down for their government [...] 
The best way to govern a society, and to engage everyone to conduct himself 
according to a plan, is for the statesman to form a system of administration, the 
most consistent possible with the interest of every individual, and never to 
flatter himself that his people will be brought to act in general, and in matters 
which purely regard the public, from any other principle than private interest.8 
 
The principle of self-interest, Steuart goes on to say, is so firm and reliable that “were 
public spirit, instead of private utility, to become the spring of actions in the 
                                                     
6 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, 
trans. Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 101-102.  Emphasis mine. 
7 Claude Adrien Helvétius, De l’Esprit (1758-9). Présentation de François Châtelet. Verviers : 
Gérard & Co. ; Paris : diffusion Inter-forum, 1973, 53. 
8 James Steuart, An Inquiry into The Principles of Political Economy: Being and Essay on the 
Science of Domestic Policy in Free Nations (London, printed for A. Millar and T. Cadell, 
1767, Vol. I., Book II, Introduction), 162-63. Emphasis mine. 
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individuals of a well-governed state, I apprehend it would spoil all” (164), and “were 
a people to become quite disinterested, there would be no possibility of governing 
them.”9  Every man, therefore, “is to act for his own interest in what regards the 
public... and it is the combination of every private interest which forms the public 
good...”  
But the most striking and most famous formulation of that connection is to be 
found in Adam Smith, who gives us an extraordinary description and devastating 
critique of the bourgeois order and ideal, yet claims that the wealth and prosperity of a 
population depend on the free play of individual interests and desires. To be sure, he 
says in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, bourgeois desires are “insatiable” and “vain” 
– vain because insatiable; but it would be even vainer to try and govern individuals by 
saying no to their desires.  More vain than the vain pursuit of wealth, power, riches, 
honour, more vain than ambition itself, which, Smith says, brings about anxiety, fear, 
and sorrow, is the attempt to curtail, diminish, and smother those desires.  For they, 
and they alone, lead to the material wellbeing of individuals and of the population as a 
whole.  
All of this to say that the “good” method of government now consists in 
knowing how to say yes to individual desires, to self-love and self-esteem.  The 
question is no longer one of knowing what is legitimate or illegitimate to desire, but 
what can bring about the highest satisfaction possible from an individual perspective.  
The problem no longer has to do with the moral quality of the object that one desires, 
but with the manner in which we make choices in order to maximise individual and 
collective satisfaction.  And that’s precisely what the new “science” of economics, 
and the newly defined space of the market, is meant to help us achieve.  
                                                     
9 Ibid., 165, 164. 
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III. Desires and Sexual Instincts: the Birth of Homo Sexualis. 
To this new problematic of governmentality, to this new question regarding 
the goals and means of government (how best to govern?  What sort of subject does 
one govern?  How much, how far, and with what aims does one need to govern?), and 
to its liberal answer, corresponds another question or problem, which is raised anew 
and transformed, and that is the delicate question of punishment: who or what does 
one punish, how does one ought to punish, and with what aim?  It’s that question, and 
the specific modality of power in which it’s raised, that accounts for the emergence of 
forensic psychiatry which, very quickly, and as early as the 1840s, established itself 
as a science of sexuality.  As we’ll see, liberal governmentality found it necessary to 
supplement the distinction between licit and illicit acts with another distinction, 
namely, that between normal and abnormal individuals, and to introduce a new 
standard of discrimination, namely, that between normal and pathological desires, or 
instincts.10  In other words, and in addition to the rewriting of desire as interest, the 
bourgeois order found it necessary to reframe the old thematic of desire in terms of a 
natural and specifically sexual instinct.  My claim, then, is that the understanding of 
desire in terms of sexual instinct and drive presupposes the emergence of psychiatry, 
but that the “psychiatric style of reasoning,” and the concept of sexuality itself, were 
made possible by a crisis or tension internal to the liberal style of reasoning.11  How 
exactly? 
                                                     
10 See M. Foucault, Les anormaux. Cours au Collège de France. 1974-1975 (Paris: 
Gallimard/Le Seuil, 1994), 15 January 1975.  Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1974-1975, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003).  Henceforth Abnormal, 
followed by English and French pagination. 
11 I borrow the expression “psychiatric style of reasoning” from A. Davidson’s The 
Emergence of Sexuality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).  A version of the 
thesis I’m putting forward here is also developed by Patrick Singy, “Sexuality and 
Liberalism,” in Miguel de Beistegui, Giuseppe Bianco and Marjorie Gracieuse, eds., The 
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 In Discipline and Punish, as well as in his lecture at the Collège de France of 
29 January 1975, Foucault emphasises the shift that took place between the classical 
age and the eighteenth century, or between sovereign power and disciplinary power, 
in what he calls “the economy of punitive power.”12  In classical law, the crime 
affected not another person, or the interests of society as a whole, but the sovereign, 
its force and physical body.  As a result, punishment was indistinguishable from the 
vengeance of the sovereign, and the return of force.  The problem of the relation 
between crime and punishment wasn’t a problem of proportion and balance, of 
measurable equality or inequality.  As Foucault puts it, if we can speak of an 
“economy” of punishment in such cases, it’s one that’s characterised not by measure 
and proportion, but by excess and the atrocious.  Here, one only need recall the torture 
and agony of William of Orange’s assassin, which lasted 18 days, or the dreadful fate 
of Oliver Cromwell.  If there’s anything that’s “monstrous,” it’s not the crime, or the 
criminal, but the punishment. Furthermore, the economy of power in question was 
such that the nature of the criminal was never in question, and the mechanics of the 
crime never became the object of a certain type of knowledge, least of all a science.  
All there is, in the case of such punishments, is a strategy of power, which unleashes 
and displays its might, wrath, and fury on the basis of the crime and around it. 
 Now it’s this type of power, and this disproportionate economy of punishment, 
which, towards the end of the eighteenth century, progressively gave way to a 
different economy of power.  It’s a form of power that seeks to “maximise its effects,” 
and does so by adopting the rationality of interests.13  How did this new rationality of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Care of Life: Transdisciplinary Perspectives in Bioethics and Biopolitics (London: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2014), 228-239; and Julie Mazaleigue-Labaste, Les Déséquilibres de l’amour. 
La genèse du concept de perversion sexuelle de la Révolution française à Freud (Montreuil-
sous-Bois: Ithaque, 2014), 73-83.   
12 M. Foucault, Abnormal, 82/76. 
13 Ibid., 87/80. 
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power alter and affect the problem and economy of punishment?  It did so in a way 
that resulted in a situation that’s quite familiar to us, and continues to define how we 
understand the relation between crime and punishment, namely, in terms of efficiency 
and effectiveness, measure and proportion, both in economic and social terms.  The 
problem is now one of knowing whether it is “interesting” for society to punish, and if 
it is, what kind of punishment will be most interesting.  Is it more interesting to 
torture or to rehabilitate?  Or is it better to prevent, through constant surveillance and 
monitoring, for example?  How much does it cost, and how can it be made cost 
effective?   
 What preliminary conclusions can we draw from this development? To the 
extent that the problem of crime, and of punishment, now bears on the interest or 
“reason” of the crime, and on its nature, the main question concerns the nature of an 
interest that is such that it violates the interest of all the other members of society.  
The question concerns the nature of an interest that ignores that its true interest 
consists in accepting the free play of collective interests.  It’s a paradoxical interest, 
an interest that goes against the nature of interest, as understood in liberal rationality.  
The problem, then, from the point of view of disciplinary power, is that its 
specifically liberal form of rationality, and the way in which it constructs social 
mechanisms and agents, as self-interested individuals, is confronted with certain acts, 
carried out by certain subjects, which it finds very difficult to make sense of, that is, 
to integrate within its own rationality.  It’s confronted with certain acts that resist and 
challenge the rationality of desire as self-interest and motive, yet seem to express a 
different type of desire, and this means a different, yet equally natural impulse.  What 
the liberal system, especially in its juridical and penal dimension, is confronted with, 
yet is initially unable to integrate or think, is the varied and often heterogeneous set of 
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acts which, confusedly and confusingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, it describes as 
“monstrous” or “evil” – acts that have in common the fact that they are without reason, 
and which it attributes to the type of the “moral monster.” 
In order to illustrate this conflict internal to liberal governmentality, let me 
focus on famous legal case, that of the Sergeant Bertrand.  Much has been written 
about it, right around the time of Bertrand’s trial in 1849, as well as by a number of 
eminent psychiatrists – including Krafft-Ebing, who used it as an example of sadism – 
in the years that followed.  More recently, and following Foucault, scholars have also 
referred to it as a turning point within the history of psychiatry.14  Bertrand was 
accused of having desecrated corpses in a horrible fashion and of having had sex with 
some of them. In the middle of the trial the presiding officer, colonel Manselon, 
questions Bertrand about his “awful desires” (désirs affreux) and asks the following 
question: “Have you ever wondered what was the point of destroying corpses that 
were already dead?”15   This question echoes one that, a few years earlier, a 
magistrate had put to Louis-Auguste Papavoine, accused of stabbing two young 
children in the heart in their pram and in front of their mother: “The common cause of 
crimes is interest.  What interest might there be in killing two children?”16  Such 
questions illustrate the limit and embarrassment of liberal penology, which 
presupposes the rational autonomy and free will of an agent, motivated by interests 
and utility.  This absence of motive, often confirmed by the perpetrators themselves, 
is precisely what caused the confusion of the judicial system.  In the absence of either 
a clear motive, by which the crime in question could be made intelligible and judged, 
                                                     
14 See M. Foucault, Abnormal, 283-87/267-71; Arnold Davidson, The Emergence of 
Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts, 4-5; Patrick Singy, op. 
cit.; Julie Mazaleigue-Labaste, op. cit., 127-163. 
15 Cited by Dr. Henri Legrand Du Saulle in La folie devant les tribunaux (Paris: F. Savy, 
1864), 527. 
16 Cited by Dr. Étienne-Jean Georget in Examen médical des procès criminels des nommés 
Léger, Feldtmann, Lecouffe, Jean-Pierre et Papavoine (Paris: Migneret, 1825), 44.  
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or evidence of dementia, on the basis of which, up until the 1830s, it could be 
exonerated, the act could only be seen as the expression of a mysterious, blind and 
irresistible force.  This, in substance, is what another famous case reveals.  In 1824, 
Antoine Léger killed a young girl, opened up her body, drank her blood to satisfy his 
thirst, cut off her genital organs, and finally ripped out her heart and ate it.  In his case, 
a magistrate spoke of an “awful mystery,” attributable, perhaps, to a “barbarous 
blood-thirstiness” and “diabolical disposition,” before concluding that such origins, 
precisely to the extent that they remain mysterious, are not a matter for the court, 
which was therefore justified in sentencing Léger to death.17  The aliénistes and 
psychiatrists of the nineteenth century were eventually called upon to elucidate the 
mysterious nature of such crimes that were precisely not crimes of passion.   It should 
be noted, in passing, that the court sentenced Léger to death on the grounds that he 
had acted not from madness, but passions.  It will thus be of the utmost importance 
for psychiatry to distinguish perversions from mere passions, however violent, and 
isolate types of desires irreducible to mere impulses.  Speaking of Léger, for example, 
Georget concludes that “he was not pushed to crime by the passions that are its 
ordinary motives; his action does not have a motive that could be admitted by reason. 
He wanted to drink blood! To eat human flesh!”18  To be sure, his “desires” are 
“entirely foreign to the civilized man;” but they are the sign of a “moral accidental 
perversion, an obvious mental disorder [aliénation].”19   
Within the rationality of crime and punishment of the nineteenth century, 
Manselon’s question to the Sergeant Bertrand, or the magistrate’s question to Léger, 
make sense.  But for us, who are now used to the “psychiatric style of reasoning,” the 
                                                     
17 Ibid., 45 and 46. 
18 Ibid., 11. 
19 Idem. My emphasis. 
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question simply fails to account for the nature of the desires and acts of the accused. 
We cannot imagine that rational motives or “interests” – or passions, for that matter – 
can be behind repeated acts of mutilation and destruction of corpses. But we do not 
feel that they can be attributed to a purely momentary state of madness, or a return to 
an animal or savage state, either.  Bertrand’s answer, on the other hand, seems to 
resonate with the way in which we have become accustomed to approaching such 
cases: “I had no goals; I felt this irresistible urge to destroy.” “When my disease 
started,” he also says, “I felt, without being aware of it, this need to destroy.”20  But if 
this “urge to destroy,” this “awful desire” can be attributed to a “disease,” as Bertrand 
himself seems to recognise, rather than to sheer moral perversity, or to a total 
madness, the question is: a disease of what?  
It’s only when psychiatry was finally able to attribute such comportments to, 
first of all, a disease that wasn’t simply the negation of health – in this instance, of 
reason – but a deviation from a norm, and thus an abnormality, and, secondly, a 
disease of a really odd natural phenomenon, disposition or faculty, namely, the 
instinct, that it was in a position to establish itself as this new discourse of authority 
on human nature, and insert itself within the legal discourse and the penal system.  By 
turning the notion of instinct into a scientific concept – and focusing, relatively 
quickly, on one instinct in particular, that of sexuality – psychiatry was able to 
discover – in fact, create – new pathologies, which themselves required treatments 
and therapies of various kinds.  The strictly clinical concept of instinct was precisely 
developed to make sense of what defied common – that is, liberal – sense, and 
designate a form of desire that escaped both its utilitarian framework and the 
bourgeois values that underpinned the type of the “moral monster.”  It became a 
                                                     
20 Legrand Du Saulle, La folie devant les tribunaux, op. cit., 525, 527. 
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clinical concept precisely by being inscribed within the distinction between the 
normal and the pathological, and understood as a natural feature prone to deviations 
from its normal state, known as perversions.21  It’s important to emphasise that, from 
the point of view of psychiatry, the emergence of that concept, and the manner in 
which it was progressively combined with that of perversion, constituted an 
epistemological break with the medicine of madness, exemplified by Pinel and 
Esquirol.  But it also introduced a grid of interpretation that escaped the moral and 
legal category of perversity and monstrosity, and provided an alternative to the 
criminal anthropologies of people like Lombroso and Tarde.  Its aim was to 
distinguish as unambiguously as possible between an evil passion and a form of 
abnormal condition characterized by a diseased instinct.  Whilst, up until then, certain 
passions might have been seen as extenuating circumstances, and thus helped soften a 
verdict, they could not, unlike insanity, entirely exclude legal responsibility. This is 
why the magistrates and lawyers, who fought against the effort to legitimize mania 
without delirium, did so by stressing as much as possible the intimate relation 
between passion and insanity.  It was therefore imperative for psychiatrists sharply to 
distinguish passion from mania without delirium: the fairness of justice as well as the 
legitimacy of forensic psychiatry rested on precisely this distinction.   
At the time, Bertrand’s actions were, like those of Cornier or Papavoine, seen 
as horrible beyond belief, so abominable that they could not possibly have been 
motivated by a mere quest for pleasure, or any other interest, especially since, as both 
the press and psychiatrists noted, he was a good-looking man who could have 
                                                     
21 For an in-depth discussion of the history and philosophical consequences of that distinction, 
see Canguilhem’s seminal The Normal and the Pathological (1943), trans. Carolyn R. 
Fawcett and Robert S. Cohen (New York: Zone Books, 1998). 
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satisfied his sexual desire with living women.22  As a result, his depravity could not be 
integrated into the phrenological paradigm developed by Gall.  Furthermore, he was, 
by all accounts, an intelligent and honest fellow, and a good non-commissioned 
officer.  He was thus not an “innate pervert.”  For those reasons he was, in the eyes of 
the public and the court, an enigma, and posed a real threat to the existing social order.  
This explains why the military court condemned him to one year in prison, the 
maximum sentence for the crime of desecration according to article 360 of the penal 
code of 1810.  But the psychiatric experts who examined him, and those who 
commented on the case, were unanimous in diagnosing an “erotic monomania” 
caused by a “perversion of the genesis instinct,” or a “deviation of the venerian 
appetite.”23  Michéa, for example, saw the sexual desire for human cadavers, soon 
known as necrophilia, as “the most extreme and rarest degree of deviation of the 
venerian instinct,” and thus as the maximum departure from the psychosexual norm.24  
Krafft-Ebing describes Bertrand’s acts as the most extreme form of sadism, and 
Épaulard the very model of “necrosadism.”25  He was the dismemberer, the ripper, the 
eviscerator, and the necrophiliac.  And yet, rather than being attributed to sheer 
wickedness, those traits were now seen as symptoms of a sexual disorder, a 
perversion of the most serious kind.  Psychiatrists were now convinced that the 
insanity of perversion is only partial, to the point of being visible only in 
comportments that are morally and socially deviant.  This is the reason why, in the 
eyes of the profane, who is incapable of distinguishing insanity from vice, 
nymphomania, for example, is indistinguishable from debauchery. 
                                                     
22 Le siècle, Wednesday 11 July 1849; see also Brierre de Boismont, “Remarques médico-
légales sur la perversion de l’instinct génésique,” 559; Jules-Gabriel-François Baillarger, “Cas 
remarquable de maladie mentale,” Annales médico-psychologiques 4 (1858), 134. 
23 See Mazaleigue-Labaste, 134. 
24 Michéa, 1849, 339. 
25 Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, op. cit., 69-70; Alexis Épaulard, Vampirisme, 
nécrophilie, nécrosadisme, nécrophagie (Lyon: A. Storck & Cie, 1901). 
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Despite their best and repeated efforts, however, psychiatrists were never able – 
in practice at least – to distinguish entirely between the clinical category of perversion 
and the theological, moral and juridical categories of perversity.  Krafft-Ebing 
formulates clearly that crucial (yet highly unstable) distinction: 
 
Perversion of the sexual instinct ... is not to be confounded with perversity in 
the sexual act; since the latter may be induced by conditions other than 
psychopathological.  The concrete perverse act, monstrous as it may be, is 
clinically not decisive.  In order to differentiate between disease (perversion) 
and vice (perversity), one must investigate the whole personality of the 
individual and the original motive leading to the perverse act.  Therein will be 
found the key to the diagnosis.26  
 
This principle of axiological neutrality is one that psychiatry – forensic psychiatry 
especially – did its utmost to uphold.  To this day, it operates like an ideal towards 
which psychiatry strives, with varying degrees of success.  Yet, whilst acknowledging 
the need to distinguish between perversion and perversity, psychiatrists of this period 
quickly admitted that it often proved difficult to do so.  Only minutely detailed 
examination could help to determine that a given patient was a genuine pervert, and 
not merely evil or wicked.  Only the most rigorous diagnosis could distinguish a 
psychosexual pathology (a perversion) from a socially or morally deviant act.  And 
yet, in many, if not most cases, the deviant conduct turned to be the condition of 
visibility, and thus of objectification, of the sexual perversion: as Mazaleigue-Labaste 
shows, the concept and clinic of fetishism were made possible by the fact that theft, 
                                                     
26 Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis (seventh edition, 1895), 53/56-57. 
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and, to a lesser extent, masturbation in public on various objects, were considered 
deviant and, as such, suppressed.27  This irreducible ambiguity, if not tension, I 
believe, can be attributed to the manner in which the old problematic of desire as 
concupiscentia, and of the flesh as a corrupt or corrupted form of desire, was 
integrated into the normal-pathological distinction, and subsumed under the concept 
of instinct, thus giving birth to the clinical category of sexual perversion and the type 
of the pervert.  Consider the following claim from Dr. Laupts’ (pseudonym of G. 
Saint-Paul), which illustrates this shift, as well as the fundamental ambiguity that 
underpins it: “Where our predecessors saw culprits [des coupables], we see patients 
[des malades]; where yesterday’s philosophers discovered a fault, we diagnose a 
nervous failure or accident.”28  However, fearful of throwing bourgeois morality, 
religion, and right with the bathwater of obscurantism, Dr. Laupts immediately adds: 
“This is not tantamount to saying that sin has disappeared,” and “perversity is a crime.”  
This ambiguity, I want to suggest, continued to shape psychiatry and psychiatric 
manuals for many years, and, I would argue, eventually triggered a decisive turn 
within psychoanalysis itself.29  But it also, and to this day, continues to haunt and 
horrify our collective consciousness and imagination, despite the constant evolution 
of what, from a clinical point of view, counts as a perversion or “paraphilia.”30  The 
                                                     
27 Julie Mazaleigue-Labaste, Les Déséquilibres de l’amour, 27. 
28 Dr. Laupts, Perversion et perversité sexuelles (1895; 2nd edition Paris, Vigot Frères, 1910), 
280. 
29 It’s by recognising that tension that Freud was eventually forced to posit the existence of a 
death drive beyond the restricted economy of the purely sexual drives, a destructive desire, 
oriented towards the self, or towards others, which signalled the limit of the rationality of the 
sexual instinct as itself a way of understanding the limits of the bourgeois rationality of self-
interest.  The problem of radical evil, and of a desire that Freud didn’t hesitate to characterise 
as “demonic” in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” continued to haunt psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis, precisely as the desire that exceeded the economy of sexual pleasure.  
30 In fact, the latest version of the DSM recognises a significant amount of new paraphilias, 
such as hebephilia, or the primary or exclusive adult sexual interest in pubescent individuals 
who are approximately 11-14 years old. And, troubling as this may be, they are still defined 
in terms of cultural abnormality and social deviance.  In the face of such a phenomenon, some 
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figure of the sexual pervert is also the figure of perversity and evil, and even, in 
novels or films, the figure of physical monstrosity.  “Sexual predators” and “monsters” 
continue to haunt the flow of daily news and popular fiction.31 
With Bertrand, and psychiatry’s prolific response to the challenges it 
presented it with, a new field was opened up, that of psychosexual pathologies, or 
sexual aberrations.  In addition to necrophilia, the phenomena of bestiality (later 
known as “zoophilia”), pornography, voyeurism, sadism, fetishism, and sexual 
inversion were all identified, most often under different names, and on the basis of 
examples borrowed from literature, history, or philosophy, as well as from empirical 
cases.  In addition, they were loosely connected with one another.  What matters, 
though, is that a new clinical field was delimited, that of the psychosexual, and a 
whole new set of pathologies, known as perversions of the sexual instinct, was 
“recognised.” Not only was sexual activity displaced from the sexual acts themselves 
to the desires that produced them, or failed to produce them (this move, you will 
recall, is one that Foucault attributes to the emergence of the epithumiac model in late 
Antiquity and early Christianity); sexual desires were clinically framed, that is, 
integrated into a strict distinction between a normal and deviant sexuality.  Thus, 
“innate” homosexuality was seen as a morbid desire for someone of the same sex, 
necrophilia a morbid desire for an inert and partial subject, fetishism a morbid desire 
for a partial object, rather than a whole person, etc.   
But this displacement, and the fact that the clinical gaze is now directed at the 
sexual desire, rather than the sexual act, has a further consequence.  With the Bertrand 
                                                                                                                                                        
have advocated the removal of all paraphilias from the psychiatric classification of diseases.  
See Patrick Singy, “How to Be a Pervert: a Modest Philosophical Critique of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,” Revista de Estudios Sociales No 43, Bogotá, 
August 2012, 139-150. 
31 The pedophile and serial killer of the first season of True Detective is, of course, a physical 
monster as well as a moral one, and the large scar on his face the visible sign of his moral 
depravation.   
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case in 1849, the perception of what is sexual, or what can be perceived as sexual, is 
altered dramatically: sexual perversions are no longer simply the (normative) result of 
the psychiatrisation of unusual erotic tastes, which already existed.  Henceforth, 
psychiatrists will see sexuality where they previously didn’t, and be able to detect the 
homosexual in the friend, the fetishist behind the specialised thief, the sadist behind 
the zealous or strict tutor. Many crimes of blood will become crimes of sex, many ill 
treatments will be attributed to a morbid eroticism; and in the face of a strange taste 
for fabrics, pigtails, or nails, psychiatrists will do their utmost to detect the point, at 
times minuscule, that will enable them to confirm their intuition and wrap the 
individual as a whole around the cloak of sexuality.32  What was once thought to be a 
merely violent act is now seen as the manifestation of a sexual perversion, that is, as 
the result of a specific kind of desire.  The clinical gaze has become sexualised, as 
well sexualising, and the homo eroticus has become homo sexualis.  
As such, the “discovery” of the sexual instinct is the discovery of not just one instinct 
among many, but, potentially at least, the key to understanding all the other instincts, 
and psychical life as a whole: “The sexual instinct,” Heinrich Kaan writes in 
Psychopathia sexualis, “controls all mental and physical life.”33  As such, it can even 
account for pathologies that are apparently entirely unrelated to sexuality.  By the 
time Freud arrived on the scene, the following statement, which he formulated in 
1905, reflected the view of many psychiatrists:     
 
People whose behaviour is in other respects normal can, under the domination 
of the most unruly of all the instincts, put themselves in the category of sick 
                                                     
32 See M. Foucault, History of Sexuality I. The Will to Know; Mazaleigue-Labaste, op. 
cit.,151-52. 
33 Cited by M. Foucault in Abnormal, 283. 
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persons in the single sphere of sexual life.  On the other hand, manifest 
abnormality in the other relations of life can invariably be shown to have a 
background of abnormal sexual conduct.34 
 
As he puts it later on in the same essay, experience has shown him that a large 
number of physiological symptoms and pathologies amongst his patients were in fact 
expressions of their sexual life and constituted their sexual activity.35  Equally, though, 
as Krafft-Ebing insisted before Freud himself, the sexual instinct is also the root of the 
noblest feelings, the highest values, and the most treasured accomplishments of 
civilization, such as art and poetry, ethics, and religion.36  Hall summarises the state 
of psychiatry at the turn of the twentieth century when he writes: “Sex is the most 
potent and magic open sesame to the deepest mysteries of life, death, religion, and 
love.”37  Sexual desire, in other words, explains just about everything.  
   
IV. Conclusion: 
The claim I have been making is that the conditions of possibility of the 
concepts of sexuality, sexual instinct and drive, as framing a new sense and 
experience of desire, lie not with some deep psychic or libidinal reality, the truth of 
which psychiatry and psychoanalysis would have finally discovered, but with a 
specific historical context, a specific construction of human nature, and a specific 
regime of power.  If, today, who we are, our sense of identity, our experience as 
subjects, is so bound up with what, unproblematically, and as a matter of course, we 
refer to as our “sexuality;” if sexuality is so commonly thought to be one of the keys 
                                                     
34 S. Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality, Penguin, volume 7: 75. 
35 Ibid., 77. 
36 Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, 1-10. 
37 G. Stanley Hall, op. cit., vol. 2, 109. 
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to our innermost self, as opposed to a mere biological phenomenon, driven by 
necessity; if desire is so obviously “sexual” – it’s because, far from signalling a 
natural phenomenon that falls outside the domain of historical emergence, it is, in the 
words of A. Davidson, “the product of systems of knowledge and modalities of power” 
that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century and “bear no claim to 
ineluctability.”38  It is a product of a style of reasoning, and thus a rationality, which 
challenges and at the same time supplements the rationality of interest and motive of 
liberal governmentality.  
Furthermore, I’ve tried to show how “sexuality” and “sexual desire” emerge as 
a result of a specific operation, or a specific graft: that of the newly conceived 
medical paradigm of the normal and the abnormal, or the pathological, onto the old 
concept and problematic of the flesh and concupiscence, inherited from Christian 
theology and pastorate.  The graft gives birth to the idea of the sexual instinct or drive.  
We need to emphasise this from the start, not only for reasons of historical accuracy, 
but also to recognise the role of the medical discourse in our understanding of 
ourselves, of the sort of subject we are, and the manner in which an entire domain, 
which was once articulated around the distinction between the permitted and the 
prohibited, and within the discourse of the Law, was re-articulated around the 
distinction between the normal and the abnormal, or the pathological.  As a result, if 
we’re going to use the concept of sexuality in any other way, outside the discourse of 
psychiatry and its intrinsic normativity, we need to know what we’re up against.  We 
need to ask whether sexuality can be so easily wrested from that discourse; we need to 
ask about the conditions under which this could be done, and the reasons why one 
would want to twist free of that discourse.  All of this to say that the simple 
                                                     
38 Arnold Davidson, “Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality,” op. cit., 32. 
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association of terms, namely, “sexual desire,” which is now often taken for granted, 
has a precise history, and, like the concept of interest, corresponds to a certain 
articulation between a type of discourse, a kind of experience, and a specific form in 
which power is exercised.  It’s not, then, as if sexual desire were a special kind of 
desire, or even, as some psychiatrists – Freud most emphatically – have claimed, the 
source of all desires and the key to understanding “human nature.”  
I’ve also tried to show how the emergence of sexual desire conflicts with, but 
also supplements, the construction of desire as interest, and as defined by the liberal 
paradigm and the discourse of political economy.  This means that, starting in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, but especially in the years 1880-1890, the subject of 
desire is defined according to two different rationalities, that of the scientia sexualis, 
and that of political economy, or that of the sexual instinct and that of economic 
interest.  Both rationalities claim to have discovered the fundamental mechanism of 
human subjectivity and action, or the key to solving the problem of human nature; 
both present themselves as the new mathesis universalis.  Both are normative 
discourses, which signal the shift from sovereign, juridical power, to biopower, or 
from the subject of the law to the living subject.  At the heart of biopower, we saw, is 
the naturalness of desire as interest.  But we saw how biopower discovers this other, 
wilder side of desire: the world of instincts, the perversions of which can lead to the 
strangest and most disturbing pathologies. 
  
 
